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SEARCH AND SEIZURE
United States Constitution Amendment IV:
[N]o warrants shall be issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
New York Constitution Article I Section 12:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized....
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. William "II"; People v. Rodriguez'
(decided June 6, 2002)
This is a consolidated action involving two cases in which
William "II" and Rodriguez were named as defendants. William II
pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana in the third degree and
Rodriguez was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree.2 The trial court denied William II's motion to
suppress, and the appellate division affirmed. The trial court
denied Rodriguez's motion to suppress, and the appellate division
then reversed, from which the state appealed.4 In both cases, the
state agreed that the stop and attempted frisk of William II, and the
'98 N.Y.2d 93, 772 N.E.2d 1150, 745 N.Y.S.2d 792 (2002).
2 Id. at 96, 772 N.E.2d at 1151, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
3id.
4 Id. at 97, 772 N.E.2d at 1152, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 794.
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traffic stop of Rodriguez both required reasonable suspicion. 5
Both cases share a common issue: "whether the facts and
information the police possessed, when coupled with an
anonymous tip that a described individual was carrying a gun,
established reasonable suspicion for the intrusions."6  In both
cases, New York Constitutional issues were not raised. Rather, the
Court of Appeals reached its decision by following the rationale of
the United States Supreme Court decision of Florida v. J.L.7 The
New York Court of Appeals ultimately granted William II's
motion to suppress, dismissed his indictment, and affirmed as to
the order given to Rodriguez.
8
In William I, the City of Ithaca Police Department received
an anonymous call signifying that a man named "Will" was a part
of a recent drive-by shooting.9 The anonymous caller gave a
physical description of Will, said he was carrying a weapon, and
was accompanied by two Caucasian males. 10 The caller also
described Will's location." Upon dispatch, one officer spotted an
individual he knew as "Will Cruz," who matched the physical
description given by the anonymous caller, with two Caucasian
males.' 2 The officer spotted the group and frisked Cruz, even
though Cruz's attire would not permit a weapon to be concealed.'
3
Another officer approached the other two males and ordered them
to face his police car.1 4 The trial court initially found that William
II ran from the police to avoid questioning and a possible frisk.' 5
Additionally, the court determined that the officer who ordered
William II to face the car "had no reason to believe that [William
II] had been handed the weapon by [Cruz] but felt that there had
been enough time for that to happen.' 16 The police eventually
' Id. at 96, 772 N.E.2d at 1151, 745 N.Y.S. at 793.
6 William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 97, 772 N.E.2d at 1151, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 793.
7 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
8 William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 100, 772 N.E.2d at 1153, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 795.




13 William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 100, 772 N.E.2d at 1153, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
14 id.
15id.
16 Id. at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 1150, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 792.
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apprehended William II, searched his backpack and discovered
marijuana and drug paraphernalia.17
In Rodriguez, police officers on patrol received a report that
a "light-skinned male Hispanic, in his twenties, with black hair,
wearin a black-and-white checkered shirt and jeans, was carrying
a gun. 8 The officers observed a man that matched the description
standing in front of a grocery store approximately two hours after
receiving the initial report.' 9 The officers watched Rodriguez get
into the back seat of a car, and the officers then followed as the
vehicle drove away. 20 The officers eventually pulled the car over,
and as they approached the vehicle, they observed Rodriguez
"dropping a gun from the car window." 21  The officers
subsequently searched Rodriguez, and placed him under arrest.22
The Court of Appeals noted that for a search and seizure to
be reasonable, it must inquire as to: "whether the officer's action
was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place." 23  Furthermore, the court discussed that a stop by
police, which is not justified from the beginning, could not be
17 id.





23 William I, 98 N.Y.2d at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 1152, 745 N.Y.S. at 794 (citing
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Terry, holds that:
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him.
392 U.S. at 20. This decision created a "stop and frisk" exception to
the probable cause requirement. Courts today will find that such a
search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons
seized may be properly introduced in evidence against the person from
whom they were taken. Id. at 31.
2003
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"validated by a subsequently acquired suspicion."24 As mentioned
earlier, the state in both cases agreed that "the police intrusions
were justifiable at their inception only if the police officers'
knowledge at the time carried a reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot.,
25
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by discussing the
United States Supreme Court case of Florida v. J.L.,26 which the
court found to be "particularly instructive" because of its
resemblance to the facts of William II and Rodriguez.
27
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals adopted the identical rationale of
United States Supreme Court in JL., and reached the same
conclusion: an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not,
without more, sufficient to justify a Terry stop and frisk 2 8 of that
person.
29
In Florida v. JL., police received notification from an
anonymous caller that a young black male, wearing a plaid shirt
standing by a bus stop with three other black males, was carrying a
gun.30 The police went to the bus stop and saw a young black
male, wearing a plaid shirt, standing amongst three other black
males.31  Aside from the anonymous tip, the officers did not
witness any unusual activity that would indicate the possibility of
criminal activity.3 2  One of the officers approached J.L., frisked
him and discovered a gun.3 3  J.L., who was under the age of
eighteen, was subsequently charged with carrying a weapon
24 Id. at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 1152, 745 N.Y.S. at 794 (citing People v. McIntosh,
96 N.Y.2d 521, 527, 755 N.E.2d 329, 333, 730 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (2001)).
25 William I, 98 N.Y. 2d at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 1152, 745 N.Y.S. at 794. In the
context of search and seizure, reasonable suspicion is, "that 'quantum of
knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious [person]
under the circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand' Id. (citing
People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444, 606 N.E.2d 951, 591 N.Y.S. 823 (1992)
(quoting People v. Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 324 N.E.2d 872, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509
(1972)).
26 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
2 7 William IL 98 N.Y.2d at 98, 772 N.E.2d at 1152, 745 N.Y.S. at 794.
28 See supra note 23.
29 William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 99, 772 N.E.2d at 1153, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
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without a license.34 J.L argued that the gun should be suppressed
because it was the "fruit of an unlawful search," and as a result, the
trial court granted J.L.'s motion.35 However, the appellate court
reversed, and the Supreme Court of Florida agreed with J.L. that
the search was "invalid under the Fourth Amendment."
36
The United States Supreme Court determined that an
anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is not, without more,
sufficient to justify a police officers' stop and frisk of that person.
37
The Court stated that the officers in J.L. based their suspicions
purely on an anonymous tip rather than their personal
observations.38 The Court then compared the facts of J.L with a
decision it made ten years earlier in Alabama v. White.
39
In White, the Court held that an anonymous tip, as
corroborated by independent police work, did provide sufficient
indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make a
Terry stop.4 ° An anonymous caller told police that a woman
driving a station wagon with a broken taillight, was carrying an
ounce of cocaine, and was going to leave an apartment building at
a specific time destined for a specific motel, which the caller
identified.4' Upon police investigation, the anonymous informant
accurately predicted every one of the woman's movements and the
police did in fact discover cocaine on her person.42 Even though
every detail mentioned by the anonymous tipster was not verified,
the Court found that "it was not unreasonable to conclude [that] the
independent corroboration by the police of significant aspects of
the informer's predictions imparted some degree of reliability to
the other allegations made by the caller." 43 The Court classified its
decision as a "close case," noting "the anonymous [tip] contained a
range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts and
14 Id. at 269.
3 J.L., 529 U.S. at 269.
36 id.
17 Id. at 274.
38 Id. at 270.
'9 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
40 Id. at 332.
41 Id. at 327.
42id.
41 Id. at 331-32.
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conditions at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third
parties not easily predicted." 4
After reviewing the facts of White, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that the facts in J.L. were clearly
distinguishable. The majority noted that unlike the anonymous call
in White, the call in J.L. did not provide police with any
"predictive information" that would allow the police to test the
informant's "knowledge or credibility. 4 5  The Court further
explained that but for the anonymous call, the police would not
have had any reason to conduct a search of J.L. The Court also
noted that merely because the allegation about the gun turned out
to be true, this alone does not justify the requisite reasonable
suspicion as required by Terry, for the "reasonableness of the
officer's suspicion must be measured by what the officers knew
before they conducted their search."4 7  As a result, the Court
concluded that, "if White was a close case on the reliability of
anonymous tips, this one surely falls on the other side of the
line. 48 Therefore, the weapon seized from J.L. was deemed the
fruit of an unlawful search and could not be used as admissible
evidence at trial.49
As mentioned earlier, the New York Court of Appeals
adopted the requirements of Florida v. JL. and applied them to
William II and Rodriguez.50 In so doing, the court found that the
"police did not have reasonable suspicion to subject William II to a
Terry stop and frisk.' Much like the police officers in JL., the
police approached William II's companion, Cruz, based solely on
an anonymous tip.52 This anonymous tip not only lacked
44 White, 496 U.S. at 332 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 (1983)).
In Gates, a "totality of the circumstances" approach is used to determine
whether an informant's tip established probable cause, whereby "the informant's
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are highly relevant." Gates, 462
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"predictive information" that would test the caller's knowledge but
also "rendered suspect when directly contradicted by the police
officer's observation that Cruz was not dressed in a manner that
would permit him to conceal a weapon on his person.,
53
Moreover, the anonymous tip in William II failed to point out the
defendant and did not present any pertinent information to propose,
"he possessed a weapon or that he engaged in any criminal
activity., 54 As a result, the New York Court of Appeals found that
the police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that
Cruz, "the subject of the tip, had handed William II the weapon."
55
Therefore, the police officers' attempted frisk of the defendant was
improper. 56
Likewise, in Rodriguez, the Court of Appeals found that the
police officers' suspicion for stopping the vehicle in which
Rodriguez was a passenger was unreasonable.5 7 The Court opined
that the officers stopped the car based solely on the fact that the
defendant matched the physical description that the anonymous
tipster provided.58 As a result, the anonymous tip, on its own,
lacked the sufficient indicia of reliability to conduct a Terry stop.
59
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals supported the appellate
division's determination that the gun, which was dropped out of
the car window by the defendant was not abandoned 60 because the
53 id.
54 Id.




59 Id. Additionally, the People's assertion that the officers stopped the vehicle
out of concern for the livery cab driver's safety was contradicted by the
testimony of the People's only witness at the suppression hearing. During
questioning, the witness, who was one of the arresting officers, stated:
Q: When you first started following the car, did you have any
reason to believe this was a gypsy cab?
A: At that time, no.
Q: And when you first stopped the vehicle, you did not know
at that time it was a gypsy cab, did you?
A: No.
Id. at 100.
60 It is important to note: "Property is deemed abandoned when the expectation
of privacy in the object or place searched has been given up by voluntarily and
knowingly discarding the property. The result is a waiver of constitutional
2003 309
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stop was not based on a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity
was afoot.
6 1
In conclusion, after the decisions of People v. William II
and People v. Rodriguez, federal and New York courts use
identical requirements in determining whether an anonymous tip
provides sufficient indicia of reliability to conduct a Terry stop. It
is clear that when information is passed through a purely
anonymous source, and wholly vague in its description of criminal
conduct as alleged by the caller, police officers may use the tip as a
means of identifying a possible suspect but must be careful to
conduct a thorough observation of the individual's conduct to
assess whether or not criminal activity is present. Due to the fact
that the Court of Appeals adopted the requirements demanded in
the Supreme Court case of Florida v. J.L., police officers in New
York cannot claim reasonable suspicion as a basis for a Terry stop
if they act solely on tips from an anonymous source.
Brooke Lupinacci
protection." People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 110, 666 N.E.2d 207,
213, 643 N.Y.S.2d 502, 508 (1996).
61 William II, 98 N.Y.2d at 100, 772 N.E.2d at 1153, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 795.
[Vol 19
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